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Abstract 
This article examines the first European Works Council (EWC) to be established in 
the Italian banking sector, at UniCredit. It focuses on the interaction between Italian, 
German and Austrian delegations of employee representatives and on the 
perspectives and practices that reflect their different cultural and institutional 
backgrounds in industrial relations. Much of the literature suggests that employee 
representatives from the home country of a multinational company are likely to mould 
EWC structures in accordance with their own national backgrounds and have greater 
confidence in dealing with central management in EWC meetings. Our findings partly 
substantiate this argument, but also suggest that minority delegations, when they 
have the benefit of strong national institutional arrangements and less fragmented 
union patterns, are more likely to be cohesive and experienced and therefore able to 
challenge management and sometimes win significant arguments over strategy. 
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Introduction 
 
The 1994 European Works Council (EWC) Directive was the product of many years¶political 
wrangling, having faced considerable opposition from right-of-centre governments and 
employers before its eventual adoption and fell far VKRUWRIWKHODERXUPRYHPHQW¶VDVSLUDWLRQV
(Köhler and González Begega, 2010). Nevertheless, in symbolic terms, it is one of the most 
important achievements of the European employment agenda, in theory representing a 
challenge to the rights of ownership and management prerogative, and allowing labour to 
assert the right to information and consultation on a permanent basis at international level 
(Waddington, 2011). 
Some of the more optimistic commentators suggested that EWCs could develop into 
a powerful and effective means of organizing workers¶ interests at supranational level (Müller 
and Platzer, 2003). However, others argued early on that EWCs were more advantageous for 
employers than for employees, were likely to increase management control, and could 
potentially marginalize trade union representation (Ramsay, 1997; Schulten, 1996). Recent 
research appears to bear out the more pessimistic view that, despite diversity both in their 
establishment and function, there are common weaknesses which emerge in the majority of 
EWCs (Köhler and González Begega, 2010). These include shortcomings in the exercise of 
 2 
information and consultation rights, scarce resources for employee representatives, agendas 
set by management, and language and cultural barriers which complicate employee-side 
representation. The competence of most EWCs rarely goes beyond information and 
consultation, with negotiation often expressly forbidden in many agreements. Only a small 
minority appear to have become effective mechanisms of interest representation (Lecher et 
al., 1999; Léonard et al., 2007; Waddington, 2003; 2011).  
However, WKHDUJXPHQWEHWZHHQµRSWLPLVWV¶DQGµSHVVLPLVWV¶reflects varying criteria 
for assessing EWC effectiveness (Cressey, 2009). For example, the value of an EWC may not 
necessarily depend on its ability to negotiate with central management but rather on its 
providing a basis for international labour networking, thus supporting unions and employee 
representatives across different countries in building contacts for cross-border cooperation 
(Ramsay, 1997). EWCs may provide useful tools for initiating learning processes that lead to 
more stable patterns of collaboration among their members (Weston and Martínez Lucio, 
1998), with regular flows of information and communication outside official meetings 
proving of key importance in reaching this objective (Andersson and Thörnqvist, 2007). 
Identity and trust have accordingly proved to be central issues in the analysis of EWCs, with 
various analysts focusing on the role of cultural and industrial relations systems in shaping the 
trust dynamics amongst employee representatives, for example British and German (Whittall, 
2000) or µQRUWKHUQ¶DQGµVRXWKHUQ¶+X]]DUGDQG'RFKHUW\,QGHHGSroblems in 
reciprocal understanding among representatives coming from different industrial relations 
systems, characterized especially by adversarial or more cooperative relations, have also been 
detected in other research (Timming 2006; Whittall et al., 2000).  
In this article we have two principal objectives. First, we examine the operation of an 
EWC in the Italian banking sector. Most studies of EWCs have concentrated on the 
manufacturing sector (Carley and Hall, 2006; Fetzer, 2008, 2012; Whittall, 2000, 2007) and 
fewer on the service sector; while very few have examined EWCs in Italian-based 
multinational companies (MNCs). In these respects this study provides a useful and timely 
contribution to the analysis of EWCs in a relatively neglected sector and country.  
Second, we explore the relationship between German and Italian employee 
representatives, who constitute the two largest national delegations in the UniCredit EWC 
(UEWC). While some research has already focused on the roles and attitudes of German 
employee representatives within EWCs, there have been few studies of the attitudes and roles 
of Italian employee representatives (Baglioni, 2011). More generally, it has been argued that 
EWCs tend to remain rooted in home country systems of employee representation and to 
focus on domestic concerns (Streeck, 1997), and that employee representatives from the home 
country have greater confidence in dealing with central management in EWC meetings 
(Stoop, 2004). In the UEWC, the numerical superiority of the Italian representatives, their 
regular contacts with head office management and their influence over the informal rules 
according to which the EWC functions would suggest that they have such an advantage. 
However, both German (and Austrian) employee representatives have cohesive relationships 
and are fully accustomed to engaging with senior management on a more equal basis, 
especially in relation to issues on which they have already reached agreements. Our article 
accordingly offers a critique and refinement of the µhome-country¶ approach.  
 
 
Research methods 
 
Our data derive from a combination of documentary analysis, semi-structured and telephone 
interviews and non-participant observation of the UEWC meetings conducted in Germany 
and Italy in 2011 and 2012. Twenty-one face-to-face interviews and two telephone interviews 
were conducted, recorded and transcribed, each lasting approximately two hours. The data 
also include press releases, statements, internal reports, agendas and material publicly 
available on company and trade union websites. Further information was gathered through 
informal discussions with UEWC members and management representatives at conferences 
and seminars. One of the authors was a non-participant observer in two UEWC plenary 
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meetings held in Milan in May and November 2012. The authors carried out their own 
translation and interpretation. 
Interviews included senior management in Italy and employee representatives from 
Austria, Germany, Italy and Luxembourg, some of whom are also trade union officials. In 
Italy, interviews were carried out with officials from the sectoral federations of the three main 
confederations, CGIL (FISAC, Federazione Italiana Sindacato Assicurazione Credito), CISL 
(FIBA, Federazione Italiana Bancari e Assicurativi) and UIL (UILCA, Unione Italiana 
Lavoratori Credito, Esattorie e Assicurazioni), and also from the independent sector trade 
unions, FABI (Federazione Autonoma Bancari Italiani) and Unisin (Unità sindacale Falcri 
Silcea) and the banking staff association, Dircredito. Most of the union officials hold senior 
positions at national level and a few have experience within their international departments 
and the European Trade Union Federation, UNI Europa Finance. The four management 
representatives included senior human resource (HR) managers and the two managers who 
acted DVWKHFRPSDQ\¶V3HUPDQHQW&RQWDFWZLWKWKH8(:& 
In Germany, the UEWC Vice-President (who is also Deputy Chair of the supervisory 
board and Chair of the central works council of HypoVereinsbank, HVB, which is part of 
UniCredit Group) was interviewed twice, together with the other German member of the 
UEWC Select Committee (SC), the Luxembourg member of the UEWC (who also sits as 
employee representative on the supervisory board established in Germany and is head of the 
works council in Luxembourg) and the Chair of the financial services area of ver.di (Vereinte 
Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft) in Bavaria. The latter is also an employee representative on the 
supervisory board of HVB and acts as external expert for the UEWC. In Austria, both 
employee representatives are members of GPA-djp (Gewerkschaft der Privatangestellten), 
the private sector white-collar union, and both sit on the supervisory board of Bank Austria 
AG.  
 
 
National systems of worker representation 
 
 
Italy 
 
Information and consultation rights provided by Decree in 2007 (transposing the EU 
Directive on a general framework for information and consultation of workers into Italian 
law) and collective agreements are the norm in Italy, rather than legally based 
codetermination mechanisms. Furthermore, the 2007 law refers to national collective 
agreements as the mechanism required to define detailed procedures to implement the 
Directive, which applies to all companies with over 50 employees.  
The Italian WorkeUV¶6WDWXWHStatuto dei lavoratori) of 1970 introduced mandatory 
plant-level union structures, rappresentanze sindacali aziendali (RSAs), in order to establish 
more structured company-level representative bodies and to recognize union rights at plant 
level. It enabled workers to establish RSAs within production units with more than 15 
employees in liaison with unions regarded as µPRVWUHSUHVHQWDWLYH¶DWQDWLRQDOOHYHO
However, RSAs did not enjoy specific rights to information and consultation. Their main 
shortcoming centred on the lack of mechanisms for union democracy and effective worker 
representation, since they favoured industry-level unions affiliated to the main confederations 
and could be elected only by workers who were also union members. Accordingly, in 1993 
the three main union confederations and the QDWLRQDOHPSOR\HUV¶DVVRFLDWLRQV signed a 
tripartite Protocol with the government to introduce unitary workplace union structures 
(rappresentanze sindacali unitarie, RSUs): in effect, works councils which would represent 
more than one union. These were further regulated by a national multi-industry agreement 
signed later the same year by the three trade union confederations and Confindustria, the 
cross-VHFWRUDOHPSOR\HUV¶ confederation. RSUs are entitled to bargaining rights at company 
level, in cooperation with local unions and in line with procedures determined by the relevant 
national collective agreements. 
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However, these agreements did not repeal the statutory provisions (which were 
partially abrogated by a referendum in 1995) allowing RSAs to be established by unions that 
have signed collective agreements in the relevant work unit. In banking, RSAs still constitute 
the only form of worker representation because of the strong presence of non-affiliated 
unions, which would not accept the imposition of an RSU (Lawlor and Serrano del Rosal, 
1999).  
 
 
Germany 
 
The Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, BetrVG) of 1952, amended in 1972, 
1988 and 2001, regulates workplace-level codetermination in Germany, establishing works 
councils (Betriebsräte) as employee-only bodies (Keller and Kirsch, 2011). They do not have 
the right to strike, and are expected to OHDGWKHLUQHJRWLDWLRQVµLQDVSLULWRIPXWXDOWUXVW¶ZLWK
management, promoting the interests of both the employees and the company. Although they 
are formally independent from unions, most works councillors are trade union members, and 
unions usually have an influence on how they operate; providing support through training and 
external advice. Works councils enjoy a set of statutory rights and powers regarding 
information, consultation and codetermination, though their role has evolved greatly in recent 
years (Gold and Artus, 2015). In addition to plant-level councils, the 1972 BetrVG provides 
for Company and Group works councils (Gesamt- and Konzernbetriebsräte), when requested 
E\ZRUNVFRXQFLOVLQVXEVLGLDULHVHPSOR\LQJDWOHDVWSHUFHQWRIWKH*URXS¶VZRUNIRUFH. In 
companies with over 200 employees, at least one works councillor is seconded to work full-
time on council business, the numbers increasing with the size of the enterprise.  
The law also provides for a two-tier board structure, with a supervisory board 
(Aufsichtsrat) and an executive board (Vorstand), in joint stock companies and limited 
liability companies with between 500 and 2,000 employees. Employee board-level 
representatives (worker directors) are granted a third of the total seats on the supervisory 
board, with the remainder allocated to shareholder representatives. Senior management 
including the CEO make up the executive board and run the business on a day-to-day basis. 
However, the supervisory board can appoint and dismiss any member of the executive board 
and monitors its activities. A labour director deals with employment relations, with the dual 
task of representing management and building cooperative relationships with employee 
representatives.  
In companies with over 2,000 employees, the 1976 Codetermination Act 
(Mitbestimmungsgesetz, MitbestG) grants equal representation to workers and trade unions 
and to shareholders respectively on the supervisory board. However, the Chair, who holds a 
casting vote, is elected by a two-thirds majority of the boarG¶VPHPEHUVDQGgenerally 
represents shareholders.  
 
 
Principal contrasts between Italy and Germany 
 
This brief outline of worker representation in Italy and Germany reveals stark contrasts 
between the two systems, which reflect the varying identities of unions in those countries 
ZLWKLQWKHµWULSOHSRODULzDWLRQ¶RIPDUNHWFODVVDQGVRFLHW\+\PDQ1: 2). Unlike their 
German counterparts, Italian trade unions have historically been more adversarial and 
fragmented across political and religious lines, with their ideology in recent times based on a 
µKLVWRULFFRPSURPLVH¶EHWZHHQFODVVDQGVRFLHW\+\PDQ1: 151). Employment relations 
are less regulated, and union-based RSAs and RSUs have developed more recently than the 
employee-based works councils system in Germany. In the banking sector, for example, 
Italian employees are represented by a total of eight unions. While FISAC, FIBA and UILCA 
are sectoral affiliates of the main union confederations, UGL Credito is affiliated to the 
smaller confederation Unione Generale dei Lavoratori. FABI, Dircredito, Unisin and 
SINFUB (Federazione Nazionale Sindacati Autonomi Personale di Credito, Finanza e 
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Assicurazioni) are a mixture of independent non-affiliated unions and staff associations. 
There is no formal system of employee board-level representation in Italy. 
The German industrial relations system, by contrast, is based on the general principle 
of social partnership rather than on adversarial labour relations, with union ideology 
reflecting µWKHD[LVEHWZHHQPDUNHWDQGVRFLHW\¶+\PDQ1: 119). Unions are more 
unified, with just one union, ver.di, representing all banking workers. The codetermination 
system established at both workplace and company levels arguably constitutes the main 
distinctive feature of German industrial relations which, along with collective bargaining, 
ensures representation of all workers whether or not union members. Employee board-level 
representation is also firmly established.  
 
 
Establishment and composition of the UEWC 
 
UniCredit, the largest Italian bank by assets, was created in 1998 following the merger of nine 
Italian banks (including two of the three so-FDOOHGµEDQNVRIQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVW¶, Credito Italiano 
and Banco di Roma), and acquired the Polish Bank Pekao in 1999. UniCredit merged with the 
German HVB Group in 2005, and then with the Italian Capitalia Group in 2007. It has 
expanded into further Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries such as Bulgaria, 
Croatia and Romania, non-EU countries such as Russia, Turkey and Ukraine and Central 
Asian countries such as Azerbaijan, and currently operates in 13 EU and nine non-EU 
countries. It employs over 160,000 workers worldwide, the majority in Italy (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1: UniCredit employment and composition of the UEWC and SC (2011-
2015) 
 
Countries Employees (%)  UEWC 
representatives 
SC 
members 
Union density 
(%) 
Italy    55,776   (33) 10 4 74 a 
Germany   23,625   (14)   4 2 15 
Poland   21,166   (12)   4 1 b 
Turkey   16,552   (10)   2 0 b 
Austria   11,742     (7)   2 1 b 
Othersc    40,964   (24) 22 0 b 
Totals 169,825 (100) 44 8  
a
 FIBA-CISL, FISAC-CGIL and FABI represent about 65 percent of Italian union membership 
b
 No reliable data available  
c
 Other countries that were assigned 2 representatives in the UEWC are: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Romania, Russia, Ukraine and Hungary 
 
 
The HVB Group had already established an EWC in 1996, and the UEWC was 
established as an employee-only body in 2007 on the basis of Article 6 of the 1994 Directive. 
German representatives wanted to establish relations with their Italian colleagues in order to 
exchange information on working conditions, bargaining activities and other issues. They 
initiated the process of establishing the EWC in 2005 following an informal meeting with the 
then CEO and Head of HR, adding that German unions and employee representatives used 
the HVB supervisory board to insist on the establishment of the UEWC as a precondition for 
the merger between then Unicredito and HVB.  
German employee representatives highlighted that the UEWC was an almost totally 
new experience for their Italian counterparts, not only because of the absence of strong 
consultation and codetermination rights in Italy, but also because of the limited development 
of EWCs within Italian companies, especially in financial services (ETUI, 2012). Italian 
XQLRQRIILFLDOVVDZLWDVDµSLORW¶FDVHDQGZHUHWKHUHIRUHNHHQWRKDYHDVWURQJLQIOXHQFHRYHU
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negotiations. According to Italian respondents, at the beginning Austrian and German 
members were more sceptical and did not fully embrace the transnational scope of the EWC 
that was being set up; they were allegedly puzzled too by the capacity of management to 
manage it effectively, although they later started to engage, seeing it as a good place for 
acquiring information on events within the Group. Though they had taken the initiative 
towards management at an earlier stage, German members acknowledged that they did not 
have high hopes over negotiations for the founding agreement. Rather, their main objective 
was to reach an agreement that would not be worse than the one they already had at the HVB 
EWC, in particular to set up direct contact with central management, to acquire information 
and to give their opinion through consultation. 
Senior Italian HR managers appeared to have a positive attitude towards setting up 
the UEWC but largely as a mechanism IRUµEUDQGVXSSRUW¶SURPRWLQJDµVHQVHRIEHORQJLQJ¶
DPRQJHPSOR\HHVJHWWLQJPRUHµGLVFLSOLQH¶LQGHFLVLRQVWDNHQDW*URXSOHYHODQGIRUPDNLQJ
decisions more acceptable at local level. Managers referred to the UEWC as being at the 
µKHDUWRIits internatLRQDOYLVLRQ¶WKHFRPSDQ\¶Vkey strategic priority. 
One of the most striking features of the UEWC is the strong presence of employee 
representatives who are also trade union members. Italian members of the SC and of the 
UEWC generally hold senior positions within their national unions; for example, they are 
chief negotiators or national coordinators for the Group and members of union policy-making 
and executive bodies; a few of them combine a long domestic career with some experience at 
international and European level. German employee representatives are all members of ver.di, 
while the Austrian representatives are from GPA-djp. German and Austrian UEWC members 
sit as employee representatives on the supervisory boards and works councils established in 
their countries. Until 2013 the UEWC was chaired by Italian Presidents representing FISAC, 
FABI and FIBA. It is assisted by two experts on behalf of UNI Europa Finance, who are 
national trade union officials from UILCA in Italy and ver.di in Germany. 
The UEWC agreement was revised in April 2011, thus avoiding the obligations of the 
2009 µUHFDVW¶ Directive. The period starting from the second ordinary meeting in November 
2011 LVNQRZQDVWKHµVHFRQGPDQGDWH¶The SC was increased in number to eight, including 
the UEWC President, and the amended agreement set new minimum thresholds for 
representation. As a result, countries like France, Greece, the Netherlands, San Marino and 
Switzerland (employing altogether about 190 workers) lost their employee representatives on 
the UEWC, whilst countries like Italy and Poland gained a larger number (see Table 1). 
The UEWC holds two plenary meetings with management each year, plus three or 
four additional meetings with the SC. Plenary meetings, which last three days, are held in 
Milan, where the Group has its headquarters. The UEWC has a Permanent Contact, a 
manager from the UniCredit International Industrial Relations office, who is responsible for 
managing interaction with the UEWC and transmitting information to the SC and UEWC. 
While senior HR management represent the company at UEWC meetings, other senior 
management may attend plenary sessions as required. 
Since the first meeting in September 2007, senior management have provided 
information about the Group including: reorganization processes and their effects on 
HPSOR\PHQWGLVFXVVLRQVDURXQGWKH8QL&UHGLWµ3HRSOH6XUYH\¶ZKLFKIRFXVHGRQHPSOR\HH
VDWLVIDFWLRQHQJDJHPHQWDQGSHUFHSWLRQVDQGVXVWDLQDELOLW\UHSRUWVDQGµEUDQGLQJ¶LQLWLDWLYHV
especially those promoting UnL&UHGLWDVDµVWURQJSOD\HU¶DW(XURSHDQOHYHO$VWKHHFRQRPLF
crisis took hold, the need to reduce costs became more central to discussions with employee 
representatives. On various occasions they requested better communications and transparency 
in relation to business decisions at Group and country level; the protection of employment 
and the involvement of employee representatives in reorganizations and mergers; and more 
LQIRUPDWLRQRQWKH*URXS¶VILQDQFLDOVLWXDWLRQIRUH[DPSOHVXUURXQGLQJUHFDSLWDOL]Dtion and 
its Employee Share Ownership Plans. 
 
 
µHome country¶ advantage? The perceptions and practices of Italian, 
German and Austrian employee representatives 
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In such a large and heterogeneous EWC, members from different countries reflect their own 
distinct and complex functions, especially when they have multiple roles within their own 
national systems of industrial relations. In this respect, the majority of Italian members see 
themselves first and foremost as trade union officials rather than as EWC members. This 
implies, as some of them highlighted, that they sometimes did not act as representatives of all 
the employees in the home country, but only as representatives of their own union. They 
sometimes found it difficult to understand the multiple roles of Austrian and German 
employee representatives, who at the same time as being employee representatives on the 
UEWC are trade union members and often union officials, supervisory board members and 
works council members in their own countries.  
The German representatives were also similarly challenged in understanding their 
Italian counterparts. Since most German representatives are members of the HVB supervisory 
board, they consider it normal to confer with management on an equal basis, and not as 
subordinates. During the first plenary meeting, for example, German employee 
representatives complained that management representatives were sitting on a higher platform 
than employee representatives; the seating arrangements were subsequently changed. German 
representatives made it clear that as members of the HVB supervisory board they did not 
expect to be treated as subordinates. One stated: µKere in Germany we accept only discussion 
[with management] at the same level, to look into HDFKRWKHU¶Veyes; and we do not wait, we 
do not react, we go forward and we say³we want this, this and this from you´¶. 
In their view, a sense of equality was one of the main differences with the Italian 
system of industrial relations as well as one of the main issues creating a lack of 
understanding with Italian employee representatives. Management were aware of these 
differences, in particular the uneasiness of Italian employee representatives in dealing with 
the complex transnational nature of the UEWC and the more confident approach of the more 
experienced Austrian and German counterparts.. 
Further concerns were raised by German and Austrian representatives regarding the 
roles of the Italian UEWC President, who has a crucial function in managing discussions in 
the plenaries, and the Head of HR. The latter had normally opened UEWC plenary meetings, 
whilst the former usually followed with a welcoming speech. The Austrian, German and a 
minority of Italian employee representatives from the independent unions argued that the 
President, and not management, should open the meeting. A German respondent reported that  
 
in Italy, management convenes and chairs the [UEWC] meeting. There is a huge 
difference and I remember once, while we were negotiating the UEWC agreement, 
we had a meeting in Munich and I made the mistake of saying to the then Head of 
Industrial Relations: µshut upLWLVQRW\RXUWXUQ¶. I destrR\HGKLVµEHOODILJXUD¶,GLG
not want this to happen, it was not my goal, but this is a huge difference. This is what 
we mean by saying that we are on the same level and that we do not accept any other 
way. 
 
Likewise, some German representatives had a critical view of the agenda-setting 
process. The UEWC Vice-President for example, expressed his uneasiness with what he saw 
as a management-led process and compared this with his experience in setting agendas as 
Chair of the German central works council. 
 
Before I myself convene a meeting, I meet the person responsible for HR, I ask him if 
there are any issues for the next meeting and then I draft the agenda.« It is very 
difficult to prepare for a meeting without any information. The German agenda is 
very stUXFWXUHG«7KHSUHSDUDWLRQIRUPHHWLQJVLVDOVRYHU\GLfferent. Every member 
has the same documents and everybody [has] the same information, so we can consult 
and make agreements.... The [UEWC] plenary meeting is more or less decided by 
management, as well as the timetable.... For me it is strange. 
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The Germans were also puzzled by the informal rules according to which their Italian 
colleagues manage the UEWC. For example, although the rules state that its President is 
elected for four years, so far each has held the post for only two years. One Italian employee 
representative stated that discussions on the four-year rule had been postponed since a four-
year mandate would be too long for representatives of the smaller Italian unions. 
Furthermore, as another pointed out, it would be difficult to reach agreement on a stronger 
role for the UEWC President because of the fragmentation and rivalry among the Italian 
unions, which hindered discussions on the issue.  
Although Austrian and German UEWC members acknowledged the added value of 
the UEWC in terms of learning from different cultures, they found it difficult to understand 
the dynamics among the five Italian unions represented. A German respondent declared: µZe 
had a change of President and they said to us, ³That is our rule in Italy: two years CGIL, two 
years FABI, two years CISL´. They said, µyou are not the majority in this council´¶ 
The Austrian and German representatives were irritated by the fact that the term of office of 
the UEWC president was decided by an agreement between the Italian unions, and that there 
appeared to be no willingness or receptiveness on the part of their Italian counterparts to 
discuss the disadvantages generated by the two-yearly rotation of this position which, in their 
view, undermined continuity: µVo it is in Italy.... Full stop. So it is, and when we do not agree, 
the Italian unions have huge problems, huge discussions amongst themselves. [In other 
words], ³Slease do not disturb´¶. Management also maintained that such rotation was a 
problem for the UEWC and weakened the Italian leadership. In their view, with such a 
system, each President pursued their own union priorities during their mandate rather than 
ensuring the long-term sustainability of the UEWC. And indeed, the mandate of the President 
will be extended to four years at the beginning of the third mandate (in the second half of 
2015). 
 
German employee representatives detected a similar issue in the excessive turnover 
of management in charge of providLQJWKHµSHUPDQHQW¶Fontact with the UEWC. For example, 
three different managers held this position between 2007 and 2012. One German respondent 
FRPSODLQHGWKDWµLf we change our President and the Permanent Contact every two years, and 
we have two meetings a year and four additional meetings of the SC, we have direct contact 
only VL[WLPHVD\HDUDQG\RXFDQ¶WUHDOO\FUHDWHDJRRGUHODWLRQVKLS like that¶. 
The UEWC President and some other Italian employee representatives admitted that 
this situation was harmful (though nothing was done to remedy it), not only because it 
damaged the image and influence of the Italian delegation, but also because it gave a certain 
advantage to more cohesive delegations from the other major countries, such as Austria and 
Germany, during debates with management and when establishing priorities and the internal 
balance of power. One Italian representative stated: 
 
on the one hand, they [Austrian and German representatives] are very determined on 
issues in their own interests and on topics on which they opposed the company in 
their own country, and then they tend to monopolize the discussion«while on other 
topics, where they have already reached an agreement in their country, they do not 
adopt any position and also try to reduce the influence of our own positions.«When 
some foreign members, for example Austrians, insist on a particular topic it becomes 
a priority. 
 
Indeed, to emphasise the internal coherence of his delegation, one German representative 
declared WKDWµZhen I go to Milan I do not represent my opinion, but German opinion. The 
four German UEWC members are responsible for all the employees in Germany¶. 
The Presidential mandate was not the only bone of contention between German and 
Italian delegates. At the beginning of the first mandate, German proposals for an office with 
one or two assistants to manage the UEWC more professionally, in line with practice in 
German works councils, were rejected by their Italian colleagues because it was seen as out of 
line with the way unions and employee representatives operate in Italy. Similarly, the 
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Germans believed that the internal dynamics of the UEWC were complicated because the 
Italians, reflecting the disunity of their unions, generally did not hold preliminary discussions 
to work out common positions before meetings with employee representatives from other 
countries. 
Issues concerning the accuracy, content and relevance of information have also 
arisen, and sometimes the more critical and direct approach adopted by German employee 
representatives has clearly caused problems for certain Italian managers. For example, when 
one of the Germans suggested that some of the statements made by senior management were 
not correct, rather than engaging, the manager concerned simply left the room. 
Varying attitudes among German and Italian employee representatives towards the 
information and consultation process and contrasting styles of behaviour during meetings 
have practical implications for the effectiveness of the UEWC. For example, during the 
plenary meeting held in May 2012, German and Austrian members were very active in 
FKDOOHQJLQJWKH*URXS¶VVWUDWHJ\that aimed to lower costs; according to them, this put 
pressure on employees working at branch level and was not viable in the longer term. 
According to management, some problems, such as the low profitability of activities carried 
out at branch level, were actually more serious in Austria and Germany than in other 
countries. This assertion was, however, challenged by members from these two countries, 
who argued that the problem was actually budget objectives that had been set too high by 
management, rather than their non-achievement by workers.  
During the follow-up meeting held in November 2012, the German Vice-President 
pointed out that the economic rationale of the Newton project, a transnational outsourcing 
project covering eight countries and 2,200 workers, was not clear. He proposed requesting 
additional information and consultation with the UEWC before the project was implemented. 
However, the Italian President disagreed over the strategic value of such a request and 
expressed his disappointment at the weak response of the plenary to the project when it had 
been presented by management, stating that it would not have been acceptable to those Italian 
workers who had already gone on strike against it. In this case, while the view of the German 
Vice-President resulted from his broader strategic judgement about the role of the UEWC 
itself, that of the Italian President was strongly influenced by the national consequences of the 
strike. This issue generated an intense debate with other German and Italian representatives, 
who pointed out that during the question and answer sessions, management could decide who 
to call to speak from the floor as they controlled the procedure. They stressed the need for a 
preliminary meeting of the SC before the plenary as well. Austrian and German 
representatives, together with one Italian member, proposed a different approach towards 
management on the Newton project. The Vice-President successfully argued that, had the 
UEWC expressed a negative view towards the project, there would have been no further 
consultation with management. The statement, as eventually agreed, emphasized that more 
information and consultation were needed before the implementation of the project and that, 
if management failed to comply appropriately before resuming the project, then legal action 
was possible. This episode serves to highlight that Austrian and German representatives were 
occasionally able to win the arguments over strategy even if they lost them over UEWC 
practices.  
According to interviews with some Italian representatives, during the second 
mandate, the Italian delegation suffered greatly from an increasing provincialism amongst 
some of its members. The detrimental effect was that, even though UniCredit is based in Italy, 
the Italian delegation was unable to adopt a leadership role because some of its members did 
not understand the added value of the UEWC and unions at national level remained 
fragmented. Moreover, the Italian delegation also included one representative from a union 
(Unisin) that did not participate in national negotiations with the other unions in the sector. As 
a consequence, according to certain Italian representatives, it was difficult to reach an 
agreement on some topics within the UEWC, which generated a lack of understanding on the 
part of non-Italian members. 
These observations tend to bear RXWWKHµKRPHFRXQWU\¶DSSURDFKWR(:&V, though 
with reservations: that the practices of EWC members from the host country will dominate 
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the operation and aspirations of an EWC, particularly when host country members form the 
majority, as they do in this case. However, the cohesion and experience of a minority, in this 
case Austrian and German members, may under certain circumstances provide a powerful 
critique of the influence of the host, even though this often fails to overturn dominant 
practices.  
 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
Time after time, Italian practices predominated in the operation of the UEWC: the conduct of 
plenary meetings and the drawing up of their agendas were management-led in the Italian 
manner, while the rules governing the rotation of the Presidency and the failure of the Italians 
to hold pre-meetings reflected the rivalry among their unions. Attempts by the Austrian and 
German delegations to reform these practices fell on deaf ears, and even their proposal to 
professionalize the UEWC office was rejected as not the Italian way. This appears to 
GHPRQVWUDWHDPDUNHGµKRPHFRXQWU\¶influence.  
Nevertheless, our study also suggests that Italian employee representatives and union 
officials appeared to be less familiar and less comfortable with information and consultation 
procedures than their German counterparts. For example, Austrian and German 
representatives were much more active in discussing the information provided by 
management, appeared to have a greater ability to deal with strategic issues and, on a number 
of occasions, even displayed ZLOOLQJQHVVWRFDOOLQWRTXHVWLRQPDQDJHPHQW¶VH[SODQDWLRQV
German employee representatives made it clear that as members of the HVB supervisory 
board they acted proactively and did not expect to be treated as subordinates.  
The Italian representatives acknowledged that they deal mostly with HR managers as 
a result of regular negotiation rounds at national level, and do not have relationships with the 
CEO and many of the senior managers from other functional areas. Furthermore, some 
recognized that their effectiveness was weakened by the fragmentation of the five Italian 
unions that are represented on the UEWC and by the varying degrees to which they value the 
body. For these reasons, the Austrian and German delegations were sometimes in a stronger 
position than the Italians and (as the episode of the Newton project demonstrated) were 
accordingly able to win the arguments on strategy. Meanwhile, all the employee 
representatives agreed that the quality of information and the level of consultation the UEWC 
enjoys were often undermined by dense agendas, the late provision of information and 
difficulties with communication. As with studies that have focused on the metal and chemical 
sectors (Pulignano, 2007: 88), our analysis also shows how the coexistence of different 
unions in one sector might hinder the development of a coherent approach at transnational 
level among representatives from the same country. Austrian and German members, 
according to Italian representatives, were able to work together and agree on policy more 
easily and appeared to have a greater ability to influence debates within the UEWC. For these 
UHDVRQVDVWURQJµKRPH-FRXQWU\DGYDQWDJH¶LQWKHVHQVHVXJJHVWHGE\6WRRS
where home country representatives rely on a privileged relationship with central 
management, cannot be clearly detected. 
Furthermore, in some respects, WKHWUDQVSRVLWLRQRIRWKHUIHDWXUHVRIWKHµGRPHVWLF
WUDGLWLRQ¶RILQGXVWULDOUHODWLRQV6WUHHFNDQG9LWROVLQWRWKH8(:&Jenerates a 
situation that is sometimes a problem. For example, some informal rules, such as that 
governing WKHOHQJWKRIWKH3UHVLGHQW¶VWHUPRIRIILFHZHUHDGRSWHGE\,WDOLDQ8(:&
members in contravention of the internal UEWC rules and apparently without the 
involvement of other employee representatives. In addition, as mentioned above, divisions 
among trade unions at national level also have a harmful effect on the internal cohesion of the 
home country delegation. 
As a result, although the 2007 UEWC agreement was strong on paper, the emergence 
of a common culture on transnational issues (Miller, 1999) and the development of a 
collective identity (Müller and Rüb, 2007) have been somewhat limited. The UEWC is 
DUJXDEO\VWLOOµERXQG¶WRWKHFXOWXUHRILWVKRPe country and is hence undermined by the 
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fragmented nature of Italian union representation; though as a counterbalance, a strong, 
cohesive delegation of employee representatives (even though a minority) may still punch 
well above its weight. While different industrial relations cultures and systems continue to 
affect the perspectives of employee representatives from the two most important national 
delegations, problems are likely to persist over matters of communication, understanding and 
networking. The coexistence of these different cultures may well limit the internal cohesion 
and strength of the UEWC (Bicknell, 2007)$µWUXVWEDUULHU¶VLPLODUWRWKDWIRXQGE\:KLWWDOO
(2000: 70) between representatives from different industrial relations systems, persists 
between Italian employee representatives and their counterparts coming from social 
partnership systems such as Austria and Germany. 
:KLOHWUDGHXQLRQVKDYHQRWEHHQµVTXHH]HGRXW¶DVSUHGLFWHGE\5DPVD\WKH
UEWC lacks a strategic approach regarding its role and activities and there is no systematic 
transnational interaction among its members. In this context, it could be regarded as a 
µVHUYLFH¶(:&, DEOHWRWDNHDGYDQWDJHRILQIRUPDWLRQZLWKµ(XURSHDQ¶DGGHGYDOXHDQGVRPH
µKRUL]RQWDO¶H[FKDQJHRIGDWDDWQDWLRQDOOHYHO, EXWXQDEOHWRGHYHORSDPRUHµ(XURFHQWULF¶
orientation (Müller and Platzer, 2003; Platzer 2009). In particular, the UEWC is handicapped 
by the expansion of the company, its structure and a predominance of Italians in senior 
management positions, a lack of influence on key strategic issues, the poor content and 
timeliness of information, little meaningful consultation, language problems and the absence 
of a strong identification with a common European culture among UEWC members. 
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